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ABSTRACT
We examine a generalized version of Flam and Helpman’s (1987) model of vertical differentiation
that maps cross-country differences in income distributions to variations in import variety and price
distributions.  The theoretical predictions are examined and confirmed using micro data on income
from the Luxemburg Income Study for 30 countries over 20 years.  The pairs of importers whose
income distributions look more similar have more export partners in common and more similar
import price distributions.  Similarly, the importers whose income distributions look more like the
world buy from more exporters and have import price distributions that look more like the world.
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1. Introduction 
There is a large literature examining how international trade affects a nation’s income 
distribution, but there is relatively little empirical work examining the reverse channel.  
This is in large part because trade models commonly rule out income effects in order to 
focus attention on supply considerations such as factor endowments or scale economies.  
To the extent that richer demand structures with non-homothetic preferences are 
employed they operate at the level of broad industries, for example, allowing poor 
countries to devote relatively large income shares to commodity foodstuffs.  In this paper 
we investigate how the distribution of income within and across countries shapes patterns 
of consumption and international trade in quality differentiated varieties within narrow 
product categories.   
Our starting point is Flam and Helpman’s (1987) model of quality differentiation in 
trade and we focus on the model’s demand side implications linking consumer incomes 
to quality choice.  As in Flam-Helpman, goods can be quality differentiated at some cost 
so that higher prices reflect higher quality, and consumers use marginal income to buy 
higher qualities rather than higher quantities of a differentiated good.  This provides an 
equilibrium mapping in which prices of goods consumed are rising in household income.   
This prediction is consistent with household evidence on consumer durables 
purchases.  Bils and Klenow (2001) use survey data for the US that reports household 
income and purchase prices and estimate positive price-income slopes (or, “Quality Engel 
Curves”).  Our interest lies in cross-country comparisons where household consumption 
choices are unobservable.  We show that the model can be written in terms of national 
income and price distributions which are, with some effort, observable. We provide a   
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theorem showing that the difference in two countries’ price distributions for the quality 
differentiated good is equal to the difference in their income distributions.  Put another 
way, countries with more similar income distributions have more similar product price 
distributions and import from a larger number of common exporters.   
We also extend Flam and Helpman (1987) to the case of multiple differentiated goods 
and multiple countries with different technologies.  In this case the quality-price 
relationship and price-income slopes vary endogenously across goods.  However, our 
result linking cross-country differences in price distributions to differences in income 
distributions goes through precisely as before because the differencing removes cross-
commodity variation in the quality-price and price-income relationships.   
To examine our model’s predictions we must first construct theoretically appropriate 
income and price distributions that are comparable within and across countries.  This 
disqualifies conventional and easily obtained measures of income differences that exploit 
exclusively within country variation (such as Gini coefficients or income decile ratios) or 
cross country variation (such as per capita income).
1  We employ internationally 
comparable household income data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) for 30 
countries and 20 years.  The LIS provides us with percentile level household income data 
from which we construct income distributions for cross-country as well as inter-temporal 
comparisons.   
We construct our price distributions using international trade data.  Previous authors 
have shown that prices vary substantially across exporters and covary with exporter 
                                                 
1 Two countries might have similar degrees of within-country income inequality according to standard 
measures such as the Gini coefficient or the 90/10 ratios of income, but have very different income means.  
Similarly, two countries might have similar mean per capita income but difference variances.   In both 
instances, our theory would predict significant differences in price distributions across the two countries. 
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characteristics such as per-capita income and per worker supplies of capital and skilled 
labor (Schott 2004, Hummels and Klenow 2005).  Further, countries with high export 
prices have larger, not smaller, shares of the markets in which they sell (Hallak 2005).  
These facts point to the primacy of quality differentiation, as opposed to measurement 
error, as an explanation for measured price variation.  For each product we observe from 
which exporters an importer buys, along with each exporter’s price and share of trade, 
and from these construct price distributions for each importer and product.  
We find strong support for our model.  The difference in importers’ price 
distributions are closely linked to the difference in their income distributions and the 
importers with similar income distributions also have more export partners in common.  
Our results are consistent with Murphy and Shleifer’s (1997) insight that rich countries 
may not trade with less developed countries unless they can produce the high quality 
goods demanded by high income consumers.  Both findings hold when we make pairwise 
comparisons of importers or when comparing an importer to the world as a whole, and 
they are stronger for consumer goods than for capital or intermediate goods.  Finally, our 
results only hold up when we use the theoretically appropriate measures of differences in 
income distributions; conventional measures of within-country income inequality 
produce coefficients with the wrong signs in our regressions. 
Our work relates to the literatures on product variety in trade, quality differentiation 
and non-homothetic preferences. Most of the empirical work in the product variety 
literature employs horizontal differentiation models in which representative agent 
consumers have love-of-variety preferences (e.g. Helpman and Krugman 1985).  These 
models have several characteristics that we highlight to contrast with our model.  One,   
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since consumers desire all foreign varieties, these models invoke fixed costs of trade to 
explain why, in the data, countries import only small subsets of available varieties.   Two, 
utility is increasing in the number of varieties, so greater variety implies greater welfare 
gains from trade.  Three, consumers allocate expenditure shares independently of income.  
Looking across markets, expenditure shares differ only because trade costs alter relative 
prices of different varieties. In our model, a household desires a single quality 
differentiated variety, while an economy as a whole desires subsets of the world’s 
varieties dictated by its income distribution. There are no fixed costs of trade but 
importers will choose not to access the foreign varieties whose qualities are too high or 
too low for consumer incomes there.  Countries whose income distributions span a wider 
range can access more varieties with no particular welfare implications.  Finally, an 
importer’s expenditure shares on particular varieties depend on the income distribution 
and so vary across countries even when these countries face a common set of prices.   
Most of the empirical work in the quality differentiation literature has focused on 
linking price variation to exporter characteristics.  Some authors have provided 
correlations with importer characteristics, showing that within product categories, 
countries with high mean income per capita buy goods with higher mean prices (Hallak 
2005, Hummels and Skiba 2004).   Our work differs in that it provides an explicit 
structural linkage between non-homothetic preferences, income variation and product 
prices.  We also examine the entire distribution of incomes and prices, rather than just the 
first moments.   
Our paper is also related to the literature on how non-homothetic preferences affect 
trade patterns (e.g. Markusen 1986, Hunter 1991, Mitra and Trindade 2005, Reimer   
  - 6 -
2005).  Most of the work in this literature allows for differences in income-expenditure 
paths across broad industries or product categories and relates cross-country differences 
in these expenditures to differences in mean per capita incomes.  An exception is Dalgin, 
Mitra and Trindade (2004), who show that the imports of luxury goods are increasing, 
(and imports of necessities are decreasing) in a measure of within-country income 
equality.  We differ from this literature in two respects.  First, we highlight quality 
differentiation as the source of the non-homotheticity and allow it to operate within rather 
than across product categories.  Second, our theory requires us to examine data on 
income distributions both within and across countries.  We show that income distribution 
measures focused on purely within-country inequality (such as the income decile ratio) 
are neither theoretically appropriate nor empirically useful for cross-country differences 
in price distributions and numbers of export partners. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides the theory linking a country’s 
income and import price distributions.  Section 3 discusses our empirical specification.  
Section 4 explains the construction of our income and price distribution data in detail.  
Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 The Model 
Flam and Helpman (1987) provide a model in which heterogeneity in household 
income is mapped into heterogeneity in optimal quality choice.  We extend their model to 
a multi-country, multi-good setting, with an analysis motivated by and focused on 
empirical feasibility.  That is, in an international context we are unable to empirically 
observe household incomes and the qualities and prices of goods consumed at the   
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household level.  However, we can observe a country’s income distribution, as well as 
the distribution of prices for imported goods.  We provide propositions linking 
differences in importers’ income distributions to differences in import price distributions. 
We start with a model with one differentiated good and identical technologies across 
countries, and then extend our analyses to multiple goods and different technologies.  We 
develop a key empirical prediction in this section, and then discuss complications to the 
stylized model that will subtly alter this prediction in section 3.   
 
2.1  Identical Technologies and One Differentiated Good 
There are two goods, a homogeneous numeraire good and a vertically differentiated 
good.  There are C countries. Each country c has population  c N , with income I 
distributed exogenously
2 according to the probability distribution function (pdf)  (.) c g  
with support  c G .   
A consumer of income I chooses quantities of the numeraire, y, and the desired 
quality, z ∈ [0, 1], of a single unit of the differentiated good in order to maximize  
(1) ( , ) . . ( ) ,
z uyz y e s ty pz I
α =+ ≤        
where  0 α > ,  z α  is the elasticity of utility with respect to quality,  () p z  is the price of 
the differentiated good with quality z, and the price of the numeraire is set to 1. We 
assume that income is sufficiently high so that every consumer consumes the 
differentiated good.  
We initially assume that all countries produce with an identical technology. The 
                                                 
2 This assumption allows us to focus on the role of national and world income distributions in determining 
quality demand, but we abstract from the feedback channels through which trade affects income, as in Flam 
and Helpman (1987)’s seminal work.      
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marginal cost of producing quality is 
(2) ( )
z MCz ew
γ = .         
w represents the cost component that is common to all the quality levels. 
z e
γ  represents 
the cost component that is unique to quality z and implies that the marginal cost increases 
exponentially with z.  z γ  is the elasticity of the marginal cost with respect to quality.  We 
assume that there are no trade costs, and that there are perfectly competitive markets at 
each quality level so that consumers in all countries face the same vector of prices 
() () p zM C z = .   
Figure 1 shows the utility maximization problem. The budget constraint DD is 
concave because by equation (2), the higher is the quality level, z, the faster the price of 
the differentiated good,  ( ) p z , increases with quality. When the indifference curve u(.) is 
tangent to DD, 
(3)  
1




=+ − ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦
    












his income on (one unit of) quality z.   
These equations enable us to write a country’s distribution of prices consumed in 
terms of its distribution of household incomes,  (.) c g .   Equations (3) and (4) indicate that 
optimal qualities (and therefore prices paid for the differentiated good) are monotonically 
increasing in income.  That is, for each quality z* there is some income level  ( *) I z  for   
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which z* is the optimal quality.  If there is no mass in the income distribution at  ( *) I z , 
then z* is not produced or consumed in equilibrium.  Conversely, for every  ( *) I z  with 
positive mass, the quality z* will be produced and consumed.
3   
Further, the number of people in country c consuming z* is equal to the number of 
persons with income  ( *) I z . As a consequence, the price distribution is a direct mapping 
from the income distribution.  The precise functional form of that mapping depends on 
the elasticities of marginal cost and marginal utility with respect to z. For example, 
suppose income is distributed log normally 
2 (, ) L μ σ . Then the observed price 
distribution is also distributed log normally 
22 (, ) La a μσ  and its mean and variance are 
directly proportional to the mean and variance of the income distribution, respectively. 
As consumer gains from quality (α ) rise, or the cost of producing quality (γ ) falls, the 
mean and variance of the price distribution also rise.   
For the more general income distribution  (.) c g  with support  c G , let  () p f Ia I =  be the 
function mapping incomes to prices.  Since prices are strictly increasing in income we 
can use (4) to rewrite income as an inverse function of prices, or  / I pa = .  Then we have 









 with  support  ( ) cp c Hf G = .
4 
Next, we describe cross-country differences in the price and income distributions.  
Because all consumers world-wide face the same vector of prices and the concave budget 
                                                 
3 This is an implication of assuming no fixed costs of production and perfectly competitive markets. 
4 For example, if Gc = [0, b], then Hc = [0, ab].  On the other hand, if ()
p f I takes a more general form than 
aI, then equation (5) becomes  ( )
11 ' (() ) (() ) [ ( ) ] () pp hpz g f pz f pz
−− =⋅   with support  ()
cp c H fG = , 
provided that  ()
p f I  is strictly increasing in income and its inverse exists and is differentiable.   
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set shown in Figure 1, equation (5) holds for every country c. This means that the price 
distribution of the differentiated good consumed in country c is mapped to its income 
distribution and that cross-country differences in the distribution of income will be 
reflected in the differences in the distribution of prices. We measure cross-country 
differences in income and price distributions using the following dis-similarity index.
5  
 
Definition 1 Dis-similarity Index (DSI): The DSI for the pair of distributions with pdf’s 
1(.) f  and  2(.) f  and supports  1 S  and  2 S  is  12 1 2
1
( , ) | () () |
2
S DSI f f f x f x dx ≡− ∫ , where 
12 SS S =∪, f1(.) is defined to be 0 for S – S1 and f2(.) defined to be 0 for S – S2.  
 
The DSI quantifies the difference between  1(.) f  and  2(.) f  by calculating the vertical 
distance between them at every point x and then aggregating these vertical distances. If 
1(.) f  and  2(.) f  are dis-similar, i.e. they lie far away from each other, the vertical 
distances between them are large and so  12 (, ) DSI f f  is large. Because both  1(.) f  and 
2(.) f  are pdf’s,  12 (, ) DSI f f  exists and is bounded between 0 and 1. 
Writing out the income similarity index explicitly, we have 
(6)  () () 12 1 2
1
(, ) | . . |
2
G IDSI g g g g dI ≡− ∫  where  G = G1 ∪ G2. 
1() gI is the height of country 1’s income pdf at income level I and  1() gI d I  is the share 
of country 1’s population that has income I. The income dissimilarity index simply 
                                                 
5 The DSI is half the L1 distance between the pdf’s 
1(.) f  and 
2(.) f .  Another commonly used distance 
metric is the L2 
2
12 [( ) ( ) ] S f xf x d x − ∫ .  We have chosen the L1 metric because it enables our DSI index to 
fall between 0 and 1.    
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measures the difference in population shares at each income level and then sums the 
difference over the support of the income distribution. 
Writing out the price dissimilarity index explicitly, we have 
(7)  12 1 2
1( ) 1 ( ) 1




PDSI h h g g dp z
aa aa
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ≡⋅ − ⋅ ∫ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
  where  () p Hf G = . 
 
Proposition 1  '' (, ) (, ) cc c c PDSI h h IDSI g g =  where c and c’ represent any country pair.  
Proof: See Appendix 1.  
 
Behind Proposition 1 is a very simple idea.  Prices are a one to one mapping from 
income, so the quantity consumed of a good with price  ( *) p z  is just the number of 
persons in a country with income  ( *) I z , and the consumption share of good  ( *) p z  is just 
the population share of persons with income  ( *) I z .  Thus the difference between the 
consumption shares for  ( *) p z  in countries 1 and 2 is just the difference in their 
population shares at  ( *) I z .  When integrating over differences in the price distributions 
we simply recover the differences in the income distributions.  
For an example to illustrate Proposition 1, suppose that the income distributions of 




1( )( ) 1


















We also find it useful to compare the income and price distributions of a country c   
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with the world distributions. The number of people with income I from country c equals 
() cc Ng Id I, while the number of people with income I worldwide equals   ( ) c cc Ng Id I ∑ .  
Let  w G  be the support of the world income distribution (i.e.  w G  is union of  1 G ,  2 G , ... 
C G ),  c c NN =∑  be the world population, and  / cc NN λ =  be country c’s share in the 
world population.  Then the world income distribution has the pdf 
(8) (.) (.) wc c c gg λ =∑   with support  w G .    
Because every consumer consumes one unit of the differentiated good, the world 
price distribution has the pdf 
(9) (.) (.) c wc c hh λ = ∑  with support  wc c HH = ∪ ,       
where  c H  is as defined in equation (5). 
 
Corollary 1 (, ) (, ) cw c w PDSI h h IDSI g g =  for every country c, where  (.) w g  and  (.) w h  are 
defined in equations (8) and (9), respectively.   
 
Hereafter, we refer to the comparisons involving two countries c and c’ as the bilateral 
comparisons and those involving a country c and the world as the multilateral 
comparisons.  
 
2.2  Multiple Differentiated Goods 
We extend the model to a multiple differentiated good setting to show that 
Proposition 1 holds for each differentiated good. Let  1... kK =  index the differentiated 
goods and  k z  denote the quality of good k.  Utility over the numeraire y and the K   
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differentiated goods is given by  
(10)   exp( ) k kk uy z α = ∑ .   
The marginal cost of each differentiated good is given by equation (2) though γ  may 
differ across goods, i.e.  ( ) exp( ) kk MCz zw γ = .  
As in equation (4), consumers spend a fixed fraction of their income on each 
differentiated good, and the remaining implications go through.  To be specific, the 















Clearly, the slopes of the price-income relationship will differ across goods k.
6  The 
goods with high values of  / kk α γ , that is, those for which there is a high ratio of marginal 
utility to marginal cost of quality, will have a steep price-income slope.  For a given 
distribution of income, goods with high values for  / kk α γ  will also have price 
distributions that have higher means and variances, just like in section 2.1.  These price 
distributions are then a measure of the endogenous degree of vertical differentiation that 
the economy supports in equilibrium, as a function of technology, preferences, and the 
distribution of income. 
However, the price dissimilarity index measures the difference between two 
countries’ price distributions and the differencing removes the variation in the price-
income slopes across goods.  Put another way, since prices for each good k are a one to 
one mapping from income, the difference between the consumption shares for  ( *) k p z  in 
                                                 
6 Bils and Klenow (2001) call these slopes “Quality Engel Curves” and use US household data to estimate 
how they differ across a set of consumer durable goods.   
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countries 1 and 2 is just the difference in their population shares at  ( *) k I z .  Thus: 
 
Corollary 2 When there are many vertically differentiated goods k = 1...K, 
'' (,) (, )
kkk
cc cc PDSI h h IDSI g g =  for every good k. 
 
2.3 Multiple Countries with Different Technologies 
Now we allow technologies to differ across supplying countries.   This creates two 
difficulties related to the continuity of the price distribution: the price-income slope 
varies discretely depending on which country is supplying the differentiated good, and in 
the price distribution there are “holes”, i.e. interior qualities for which there is no 
demand. However, as was the case with multiple goods described in section 2.2, we show 
that both problems are eliminated by differencing two consuming countries’ price 
distributions.   
For notational simplicity, we return to the one good case, though it is easily shown 
that Corollary 2 holds when technologies differ across supplying countries. The marginal 
cost of producing quality z in country j is 
(12) ( ) exp( ) jj j MCz z w γ = .         
j w  represents the cost differences (due to factor price or Ricardian technology 
differences) that are common to all quality levels.  exp( ) jz γ  expresses the degree to 
which country j has a comparative advantage in high or low quality levels. We continue 
to assume that there are no trade costs, so that the consumers desiring quality z buy it 
from the lowest marginal cost provider. 
The assumption on technology allows different suppliers to have a comparative   
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advantage in different ranges of quality and so creates kinks in the budget set and a 
discontinuous relationship between prices and income.  Despite this complication, 
equations (3) and (4) hold with small adjustments.  To illustrate this point, we use the 
two-country setting of Flam and Helpman (1987), where the North and the South have 
technologies ( ) exp( ) NN N MCz z w γ =  and  ( ) exp( ) SS S MCz z w γ =  with  NS γ γ <  and 
SN ww < . The North has the comparative advantage in high qualities.  
Figure 2 shows the utility maximization problem for a consumer with income  d I  and 
u(.) is the indifference curve. Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1 except that the budget 
constraint now has two segments. When quality is low, it is cheaper to produce the 
differentiated good in the South and so the budget constraint is determined by the 
Southern marginal cost (along the curve  S DT). When quality is higher than at point T, 
the budget constraint is determined by the Northern marginal cost (along the curve  N TD ). 
The indifference curve is tangent to both segments of the budget constraint; i.e. a 
consumer with income  d I  is indifferent between buying the differentiated good from the 
North and buying it from the South. Let  1 z  and  2 z  be the quality levels associated with 
the tangent points.  
First, note that there is no demand, in the North or the South, for the qualities between 
1 z  and  2 z .  Second, for the qualities that are actually supplied to the market, 
[ ] [ ] 12 0, ,1 zz ∪ , equations (3) and (4) hold with the following adjustments: for incomes 
below  d I ,  S γ  and  S w  replace γ and w, and for incomes above  d I ,  N γ  and  N w  replace γ 
and w.  That is, when the differentiated good is purchased from the South (North), the 
price-income slope in (4) is determined by Southern (Northern) technology.  However,   
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two consumers living in different countries but with the same income face the same 
price-income slope. 
More generally, let j = 1…J index supplying countries, with each j being the lowest 
cost supplier of some set of qualities  j Z .  Let  j G  be the set of incomes for which some 
qualities in the set  j Z  are the optimal quality choice so that consumers with  j I G ∈  buy 
the differentiated good from exporter j.  Since every consumer buys the differentiated 
good from somewhere,  jj w GG ∪=  (recall that  w G  is the support of the world income 
distribution). Then equation (4)  becomes 







, for all j. 
Rather than a single line of constant slope mapping incomes into prices, we have a set of 
lines whose slopes are determined by the technology of the lowest cost producer for the 
corresponding quality segment. 
To get the price distribution in consuming country c we must combine the more 
complex expression for the price-income slopes (13) with country c’s income 
distribution.  Let  ( ) pj j f Ia I =  and let  cj c j GGG = ∩ .  cj G  describes the set of incomes for 
which consumers in country c buy the differentiated good from exporter j.
7  Then the 
price distribution of country c is still a transformation of its income distribution, but it is 
discontinuous and must be evaluated separately over segments of the income distribution.  
                                                 
7 Supplier j produces the range of qualities that appeal to consumers with income range 
j G , but incomes in 
country c may span part, but not all, of the range.   













   for  ( ) ( ) pj cj p zf G ∈ , with support  ( ) cj p j c j Hf G =∪  
Unlike in the identical-technology case, the support of the price distribution now 
consists of disjoint intervals that correspond to the ranges of qualities actually supplied in 
the world.   The definition of the dis-similarity index (DSI), and equation (6), the 
expression for IDSI, do not change, but the expression for PDSI does change.  Since the 
support of the price distribution consists of disjoint intervals, PDSI equals the sum of 
integrals over these intervals. Let  12 jj j GG G = ∪  be the set of income with which a 
consumer in country 1 or country 2 buys the differentiated good from exporter j.  Then 
the expression for PDSI becomes
9 
(15)  1 12 1 2
1( ) 1 ( ) 1











≡⋅ − ⋅ ∑ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∫ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
 
where  () j j pj Hf G = . 
Although the expression for PDSI becomes more complex, Proposition 1 remains 
intact.  Consider first the “holes” in the price distribution, those qualities that are not 
demanded by any income level and so not demanded by any country. Since these 
qualities have zero consumption shares for both countries 1 and 2, they carry zero 
weights in the price distribution for both countries and simply drop out when 
differencing.  Next consider the qualities actually supplied in the world.  These segments 
                                                 
8 Like (5), equation (14) still holds when  ()
pj f I  takes a more general form than  ()
pjj f Ia I = , provided that 
()
pj f I  is strictly increasing in Gj, its inverse exists and is differentiable in Gj. 
9 Note that 
12 jj GGG ∪= ∪ and so 
12 jj H HH ∪= ∪ , where H1 and H2 are as defined in equation (14).   
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have different price-income slopes given by (13), but along each segment prices are still a 
one to one mapping from income.  Just as in the multi-good case, measuring cross 
country differences in price distributions removes the differences in the price-income 
slope.  The difference between the consumption shares for the good with price  ( *) p z  in 
countries 1 and 2 still equals the difference in their population shares at income  ( *) I z .  
To illustrate equations (14) and (15), consider the Flam and Helpman (1987) two-
country example again. Suppose the support of the South’s income distribution is [0, bS] 
and the support of the North’s income distribution is [0, bN], bN > bS.  Consumers in both 
countries with income [0, Id] buy the differentiated good from the South and those with 



































and similarly for the North.  Calculating the PDSI gives us 




1( ) ( ) 1
|| ( )
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PDSI g dp z
aa
pz pz
gg d p z
aa a
pz pz






+− ∫ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
+− ∫ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
  







N b gd I ∫  +  0
1
|( . ) ( . ) |
2
d I
NS gg d I − ∫  +
1





NS I gg d I − ∫ . Each of 
the three terms in PDSI(.) equals its counterpart in IDSI(.) and so PDSI(.) = IDSI(.).  
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3 Empirical Specification 
Our model derives a direct linkage between a consuming country’s income 
distribution and that country’s distribution of consumer prices for a particular quality 
differentiated good.  Proposition 1 shows that the difference in two countries’ price 
distributions for a particular good is equal to the difference in their income distributions.  
As we show in sections 2.2 and 2.3, examining cross-country differences in price 
distributions also allows us to control for differences in the price-income slopes across 
products and across suppliers. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to get cross-country data on all sales prices within 
some narrowly defined consumer good.   However, it is possible to use import price data 
to approximate the price distributions.  Given the technology assumed in equation (12) 
each exporting country j will specialize in a range of qualities, with a corresponding 
range of export prices.  By knowing the prices charged by each exporter j, as well as the 
share of exporter j in importer c’s purchases, we can calculate the import price 
distributions for importers c and c’ and the difference between them.  
We can then test two implications of the theory.  The first directly follows from 
Proposition 1, implemented across country pairs c-c’ 
(17)  '0 ' ' (,) (, ) cc P cc c c PDSI h h IDSI g g e αβ =+ +. 
The price distributions for two importers can differ either because they buy from different 
sets of exporters, or because they buy from similar sets of exporters but with different 
shares.  For reasons we will describe below, international prices are subject to 
measurement error and so we employ a second test that looks only at whether two 
importers buy from a common set of exporters.   
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(18)  '' ' ln( ) ln( ) cc N cc cc NI D S I e αβ =+ +  
where  ' cc N  is the number of exporters countries c and c’ have in common.   Following 
the theory, let some exporter j produce quality  * z .  Then two importers will buy from 
exporter j only if both have some population with income  ( *) I z . The smaller the overlap 
between two importer’s income distribution (i.e. the larger is their income dis-similarity 
index), the fewer the exporters they will have in common.
10  
In implementing regressions (17) and (18) we make three modifications. First, we 
follow Corollary 2 and pool the observations across all the products. Second, Corollary 1 
enables us to also compare an importer to the rest of the world. We do so by replacing the 
bilateral price and income dis-similarity indices in (17) with the multilateral price and 
income dis-similarity indices and replacing the number of common exporters in (18)  
with the number of exporters. The multilateral comparisons have a more direct analogue 
to the work that examines the level and growth of product variety across importers.  
Finally, models with fixed costs of trade as in Melitz (2003) suggest that countries 
will import a larger set of varieties when the market is large and when trade costs are low. 
We augment regressions (17) and (18) with measures of market size
11 and trade costs for 
the multilateral regressions or relative market size and distance between the importer 
pairs for the bilateral regressions.  This gives us four estimating equations.  For the 
bilateral comparisons we have 
                                                 
10 Note that two exporters (e.g. Mexico and Poland) might have identical technology and so specialize in an 
identical spectrum of quality.  In this case, our theory does not say from which exporter two importers (e.g. 
US and Germany) will buy quality z*, only that they will buy from someone.  If the US buys only from 
Mexico and Germany only from Poland, regression (18) would fail (i.e.  0
N β = ) but (17) would still hold 
(i.e.  0
P β > ). 
11 We use GDP to measure market size. GDP is the product of population and GDP per capita, and GDP per 
capita may be correlated with the mean of the income distribution.  We also use population to control for 
market size instead and find similar results..   
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(19)  '' 2 3 ' '
'
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln
k k ct
cc t F N cc t cc cc t
ct
GDP
NI D S I D I S T
GDP
α βββ ε =+ + + + 









α ββ β ε =+ + + +, 
where k indexes products, t indexes time and αF is a set of fixed effects we will explain 
below. For the multilateral comparisons we have 
(21)  23 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln
k k
ct F N cwt ct ct ct NI D S I G D P M P α ββ β ε =+ + + +  
(22)  23 ln( ) ln
k k
cwt F P cwt ct ct ct PDSI IDSI GDP MP α ββ βε =+ + + + , 










= ∑  is the market potential of 
country c (e.g. Hanson and Xiang 2004) and measures the “remoteness” of c with respect 
to the world.  We implement each of these regressions in cross-sections for each wave 
(i.e. t does not vary) and include product fixed effects ( )
k
F α α = .
12 We also discuss the 
panel versions of these regressions in section 5.2.  
Representative agent models with homothetic preferences imply that a country’s 
income distribution should have no effect on the number of goods it imports or their price 
distribution, i.e.  0 N β =  and  0 P β = .  We take  0 N β <  and  0 P β >  as evidence for our 
theory with quality differentiation and non-homothetic preferences.  Even though 
Proposition 1 implies a more stringent test for the price distribution regressions, 
0 0, 1 P α β == , the model of section 2 is stylized.  When confronting the data we face 
difficulties due to missing domestic sales data, trade costs, and more general forms of 
                                                 
12 Since IDSI does not vary across products, we have cluster samples and the observations within a cluster 
might be correlated.  We employ Wooldridge (2002)’s test for random effects and fail to reject the 
hypothesis that the within cluster correlations are zero.  We also employ robust standard errors (the 
“cluster” command in STATA) and obtain similar results.    
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quantity choice.  
We use import price data to calculate price distributions, and so we will miss 
domestic sales data, the portion of the price distribution that a country supplies to itself.   
We cannot sign the biases in our estimates of  P β  in all cases, but we provide two results 
in Appendix 1.  First, recall the setup in Flam-Helpman (1987), where the higher income 
country also produces higher quality goods.
13  In this case omitting domestic sales will 
truncate the higher income country’s price distribution from above, and truncate the 
lower income country’s price distribution from below.  This reduces the measured 
variation in PDSI relative to IDSI and biases  P β  downward away from 1.  Second, the 
errors to the measured price distribution approach zero as the number of countries, C, 
becomes large and the range of qualities each country supplies shrinks.  Having relative 
size controls in our estimating equations (19)-(22) also helps address this bias, and we 
experiment with additional robustness checks in section 5. 
Our theory assumed away trade costs so that all importers would face the same lowest 
cost supplier for each quality.  With trade costs, a country might source a smaller range of 
qualities from abroad and a larger range from itself, and this raises the same issues as 
missing domestic sales data. Trade costs also imply that different countries might import 
the same quality from different exporters, as discussed in footnote 10.  We control for 
trade costs using distance in the bilateral comparisons and market potential in the 
multilateral comparisons.   
Finally, our theory assumed that every consumer would purchase one unit of the 
differentiated good.  In a more general setting, consumers might use marginal income to 
                                                 
13 In the fully specified general equilibrium, higher incomes and the ability to produce higher quality goods 
both stem from a larger endowment of skilled labor.   
  - 23 -
expand consumption both on a quantity and a quality dimension (Bils and Klenow 2001).  
We derive the expressions for the price distribution and the price dis-similarity index, 
PDSI, for this more general form of quantity choice in Appendix 1.  However, the exact 
relationship between PDSI and IDSI is complicated by interactions between the income 
distribution and the functions mapping income into optimal quantity choice, and so we 
cannot sign the bias to our estimates of  P β .  
 
4 Data 
4.1 Income Data 
To facilitate cross-country and inter-temporal comparisons of income distributions, 
we employ the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data.  The LIS data are a compilation of 
the income survey data files of 30 countries, made comparable by rearranging or 
reclassifying the income measures from national household budget surveys. 
Another widely used dataset on cross-country income distribution is Deininger and 
Squire (1996) and its extensions by the World Bank (the DSWB).
14 We have chosen the 
LIS data for three reasons. One, the LIS is more consistent and better suited for cross-
country and inter-temporal comparisons of income distributions (Atkinson and 
Brandolini 2001, Deaton 2003).  It provides disposable household income (monetary 
income after direct taxes and transfer payments), and allows us to make adjustments to 
account for differences in family size.  Two, the LIS allows us to calculate household 
income at single percentile increments while the DSWB provides quintile level income 
shares.  Three, even though the LIS covers a smaller number of countries than the 
                                                 
14 For other income distribution data see Chen and Ravallion (2001), Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) 
and Milanovic (2002).    
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DSWB, our theory makes predictions that involve pair-wise comparisons of countries and 
so we can still generate considerable cross-section variation in income distributions.    
As shown in Table 1, we have up to 30 countries at roughly 5 year intervals for the 
period 1979-2001 (Wave 1 - Wave 5).   The starred countries in Table 1 have data for 
only one or two years.  In some other cases, data are missing for a wave and have been 
estimated following a procedure detailed in Appendix 2.  In Table 1 we mark such cases 
with an “(e)”. 
Our theory requires us to construct and then compare income distributions across 
countries.  To construct a continuous income distribution from the discrete household 
income data we perform a non-parametric kernel estimation using the “kdensity” 
command in STATA (Deaton 1997). We use STATA’s default kernel, the Epanechnikov, 
and STATA’s default bandwidth,
15 and evaluate the densities of the distributions of all 
the countries at the same income levels of $100, $200 ... $150,000.
16 We then calculate 
the differences in income distributions, both pair wise and relative to the “world” 
following equations (6) and (8).  For our purposes the “world” consists of all the 
countries in the LIS data in a given year.
17   We then multiply the IDSI by 100.  
Figure 3 shows several measures of income dispersion for the LIS countries in Wave 
5 (2000).  The 3
rd column reports the multilateral income dissimilarity index (IDSI) given 
by equation (6).  The 4
th column reports a more conventional measure of within-country 
income dispersion, the ratio of the 90
th percentile income to the 10
th percentile income, or 
                                                 
15 The choice of kernel tends to be relatively unimportant in practice (e.g. DiNardo and Tobias 2001) and 
STATA’s default bandwidth is based on Silverman (1986)’s optimal bandwidth. 
16 It is vital that the evaluations be at the same income levels; otherwise we would calculate many IDSI’s to 
be 1. To see this, suppose we record country 1’s distribution as $10 and $20 with probabilities 0.5 and 
country 2’s distribution as $10.1 and $19.9 with probabilities 0.5. Then we will calculate their IDSI as 1.  
17 Note that this builds in a correlation between the world income distribution and the individual countries’ 
distributions in our sample.  We experiment with excluding country c from the construction of the world 
distribution for comparison to country c and obtain similar results.   
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decile ratio.  Finally, we normalize each country’s income relative to the US median 
income ($24,094 = 100) and plot the range of income starting at the 10
th percentile (P10) 
and ending at the 90
th percentile (P90).  We arrange the countries in ascending order of 
their decile ratios.  
While the decile ratio as a measure of income dispersion has some obvious appeal 
(e.g., insensitivity to top/bottom coding, ease of understanding), it provides no 
information  about how much of the world income distribution a country’s income spans.  
This can be seen by comparing the US and Mexico in Figure 3. The decile ratio for 
Mexico (10.4) is nearly twice that of the US (5.4), but as the mean income levels for 
Mexico are lower than those for the US, Mexico’s income distribution spans a much 
smaller range than the US.   
Further, the decile ratio contains no information about how two countries’ income 
distributions compare within the P10-P90 range.  In contrast, our IDSI measure employs 
data from all points in the income distribution and explicitly compares both the level and 
distribution of two countries’ income.  When the income distributions of two countries lie 
far away from each other (e.g. the US and Mexico in Figure 3), the vertical distances 
between them are large at each point in the distribution and IDSI is large.  IDSI achieves 
its maximal value of 100 if two countries have completely disjoint distributions and 
achieves its minimal value of 0 if two countries have identical distributions.  
 
4.2 Data on Import Prices and their Distributions 
The trade data to implement regressions (19)-(22) come from the world trade flows 
database (the WTF) (Feenstra et. al., 2005) and the United Nations (UN) trade database.    
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These data report bilateral import value and quantity at the SITC 4 digit level (roughly 
1000 goods).  To match the LIS income data wave 1 – 5, we use import data for 1980, 
1985, 1990, 1995, and 1999.
18  
These data allow us to count the number of exporters from whom an importer has 
purchased a product in a given year (for multilateral comparisons), or the number of 
common exporters from whom two importers have purchased a good (for bilateral 
comparisons).   These counts are used as the dependent variables in estimating equations 
(19) and (21). 
The price data are more problematic and subject to measurement errors of three sorts.  
First, we construct import prices using import unit values (value/quantity), but the 
quantity units are unknown and are likely to be importer specific.
19  Controlling for the 
measurement error of this sort is critical for our application because we can not properly 
calculate the difference between two importers’ price distributions unless we have 
accurate data on the level of prices.   Second, exporters may produce a range of qualities 
within a product category, but we observe average prices rather than the entire range.  
Third, quantity (but not value) data are missing for some of the importers    
Accordingly, we extract exporter-specific signals from the noise of the raw data in the 
following way.  For each SITC 4 digit product k, we observe the raw prices (unit values) 
for some subset of importer c – exporter j pairs.  We regress the log price on importer-
product and exporter-product fixed effects plus bilateral distance. 
(23)  ln Distance
kk k k k
cjt ct jt t cj cjt p α αβ ε =++ + 
Bilateral distance sweeps out Alchian-Allen effects in pricing (Hummels and Skiba 2005) 
                                                 
18 The WTF 2000 data has some technical problems (Feenstra et al. 2005), so we use 1999 data. 
19 Some importers might report quantities in weight terms, either kilograms or pounds, while others use 
counts.  See also Hummels and Klenow (2005).     
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and the importer-product fixed effects absorb the variation in unit values that arises from 
differences in units.   
We use the exporter-product fixed effects as our measure of export prices, 
n ˆ ln
kk
jt jt p α = .  This implies that any importer c buying product k from exporter j faces this 
common export price.  In addition to removing importer-specific measurement errors, 
regression (23) provides us with (estimated) exporter prices even for those importers for 
whom no quantity data are reported. 
A drawback of this approach is that we may lose useful variation across importers in 
the price charged by a particular exporter.  For example, suppose that Germany produces 
a range of car qualities (and prices). While Mexico imports cars from the lower end of the 
range, the US may import the entire quality range.  Unfortunately, we are unable to 
separate this true variation in German export prices from importer-specific measurement 
errors, and so we err on the side of removing all the importer-specific variation. 
Does this approach yield sensible export price data?  We know from previous work 
using different data that prices are highly correlated with exporter’s per capita income 
(Schott 2003, Hummels and Klenow 2005).  We regress log prices on exporter per capita 
GDP and product fixed effects, using both the raw price data, ln
k
cjt p , and our estimated 
prices, n ln
k




ln 0.97 .246ln( / ) 0.48
ln 2.95 .233ln( / ) 0.94
kk k
cjt jt jt t cjt
kk k
jt jt jt t cjt
pY L e R
pY L e R
α
α
=− + + + =
=− + + + =
 
There is no statistically significant difference in the exporter per capita GDP coefficient.  
However, the regression using our estimated prices has almost twice the R
2 of the   
  - 28 -
regression using the raw data.  This suggests that our estimated prices are much cleaner 
measures than the raw prices. 
We use these estimated prices to construct a price distribution for each importer c, 
product k and wave t in the following way.  We take the estimated prices n ln
k
jt p  of every 
exporter j, and weigh them by the share of j in importer c’s purchases of k (this share is 
zero if j does not ship to c).
20  The resulting distribution is discrete and we again employ 
the nonparametric kernel estimation to obtain a smooth price distribution.  Finally, we 
take the differences in the price distributions (either relative to another importer c’ or to 
the world) to obtain the price dis-similarity indices following Definition 1.
21  We then 
multiply the PDSI by 100.  
 
5. Results 
We calculate the coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) for the key 
variables in regressions (19)-(22) using the data of all countries and all waves and report 
the results in Table 2.  Not surprisingly, the variables for the bilateral comparisons have 
more variation (relative to the means) than those for the multilateral comparisons.  Figure 
4 plots the simple average of the multilateral PDSI across all products against the 
multilateral IDSI for wave 2 and shows a clear positive correlation between these two 
variables.  Their correlation coefficient is a significant 0.42.  Figure 5 is the 
                                                 
20 We use the value shares, even though quantity shares are more consistent with theory, because quantity 
data are missing for a significant number of observations (e.g. 34% of the observations for wave 1).  We 
experiment with dropping the observations with missing quantity data, or imputing the missing quantities 
as values divided by the prices estimated using equation (23), and then constructing price distributions 
using quantity shares.  The results are almost identical to Tables 3-6 
21 The “world” consists of those countries for whom we have income measures from LIS, not the entire 
sample of world trade flows.   
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corresponding scatter plot for the bilateral PDSI and IDSI; again, the positive correlation 
is unmistakable, with a statistically significant correlation coefficient of 0.51.   
 
5.1 Main Regression Results 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating the multilateral PDSI regression (22) by 
wave. The dependent variable is the multilateral price dis-similarity index (PDSI).   In the 
top panel we estimate the base regression with the multilateral income dis-similarity 
index (IDSI) as the only regressor, and in the bottom panel we include the additional 
control variables of log GDP and log market potential.  For the base regression, the 
coefficients on the multilateral IDSI are positive and precisely estimated for all waves, 
ranging from 0.2 (wave 5) to 0.45 (wave 2).  These coefficients are somewhat smaller 
when we include the additional controls, but the positive correlation between IDSI and 
PDSI remains significant.  That is to say, the countries whose income distributions are 
most different from the world also have import price distributions that are most different 
from the world, consistent with our theory.  On the other hand, our control variables have 
the expected signs:  small domestic markets and those farthest from suppliers have price 
distributions less similar to the world.   
Table 4 is organized similarly to Table 3 and reports the bilateral PDSI regression 
(20). Like in Table 3, the coefficients on (the bilateral) IDSI are positive and significant 
for all waves, with or without the additional controls of log distance and the absolute 
value of the log difference in GDP. Again our control variables have the expected signs:  
the countries of different sizes have dissimilar price distributions, as do the countries far 
away from one another.  The latter is important as Proposition 1 rests on the assumption   
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that trade costs are negligible (so that all importers face a similar price vector) whereas  
trade costs are likely to matter in the data.  Thus it is reassuring that introducing the 
additional control variables does not substantially alter the coefficients on IDSI. 
Table 5 reports the results of the number-of-export-partner regression (21).  Unlike 
for the PDSI regressions (20) and (22), theory does not provide a specific functional form 
for regression (21) and so we report the log linear specification in the top panel and the 
linear specification in the bottom panel.  The linear specification has more observations 
because it includes the zero values and also has lower adjusted R
2.  In both specifications 
the coefficients on (the multilateral) IDSI are negative and precisely estimated, and they 
range from -0.11 to -0.47 for the log linear specification.
22  Put another way, the countries 
whose income distributions are more similar to the world source from a larger set of 
export partners, consistent with our theory.  On the other hand, country size is positively 
correlated with the number of export partners for most waves but market potential has 
limited impacts. 
Table 6 is organized similarly to Table 5 and reports the results of the number-of-
common-export-partner regression (19), again estimated with both log linear and linear 
specifications.  Again, consistent with our theory, the coefficients on IDSI are negative 
and significant and they range from -0.17 to -0.25 for the log linear specification:  the 
countries with dissimilar income distributions have fewer export partners in common, 
consistent with our theory.  Distant countries also have fewer export partners in common.   
 
5.2 Robustness Exercises 
                                                 
22 It is misleading to directly compare the coefficients on IDSI for the log linear specification with the 
linear specification because the former are elasticities but the latter are derivatives of levels on levels.    
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We also explore whether the changes in income distribution within a country over 
time induce changes in this country’s import price distribution.  We do so by pooling 
over waves 1-5 and estimating regressions (19)-(22) in panels.  Since the set of countries 
with available income data varies by wave and the multilateral PDSI and IDSI change 
with the country composition of the data, we restrict our sample to the set of countries 
(those without a “*” in Table 1) whose data are available for all waves.  We also include 
country-pair by product or country by product fixed effects to focus on inter-temporal 
variation.  The results for the panel regressions are weaker than those for the cross-
section regressions in Tables 3-6: the IDSI coefficients are much smaller in magnitude 
and sometimes not significant. This is likely because most of the variation in the PDSI 
and IDSI is cross-sectional. For example, an analysis-of-variance shows that the cross-
country variation of the multilateral PDSI is over 28 times the inter-temporal variation.  
So far we have pooled over all product codes available in the data.  One may be 
concerned that our theory maps household incomes into consumer product prices and so 
may be less appropriate for intermediate or capital goods.
23  We use the UN Broad 
Economic Classification system to separate the SITC product codes into consumption, 
intermediate and capital goods and then re-run regressions (19)-(22) for each of the three 
categories, employing all controls.
24  To save space we only report the IDSI coefficients 
and their standard errors for the consumption goods regressions in Table 7.  They are 
significant and have the expected signs and are similar in magnitude to those in Tables 3-
                                                 
23 If high quality consumption goods are made using high quality intermediate and capital goods in the 
country of consumption then the idea behind the theory goes through as before.  It is more problematic in 
cases, like Mexico, where a lower income country imports high quality intermediates in order to produce 
high quality consumption goods for export to the US. 
24 We also experimented with separating the SITC products into manufacturing goods (SITC 5-8) and 
commodities (SITC 0-4), or into differentiated, reference priced and homogeneous goods using the Rauch 
(1999) classification.  The results for regressions (19)-(22) are similar between these categories. 
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6.  The IDSI coefficients for the intermediate and capital goods regressions are also 
significant and have the expected signs in most cases, although they tend to be smaller in 
magnitude than those for the consumption goods regressions.   
Our measure of income dissimilarity, IDSI, is derived from theory and it uses both 
within- and cross-country information on income distribution.  Does a more conventional 
and less theoretically appropriate measure also work?  We replace the multilateral IDSI 
in regressions (21)-(22) with the decile ratio (the ratio of the 90
th percentile income to the 
10
th percentile income), a measure that reflects only within-country inequality.  Suppose 
that all countries had identical median incomes so that the decile ratio were a sufficient 
statistic for an importer’s income range relative to other countries’.  Then according to 
our theory, the decile ratio should be positively correlated with the number of exporters 
and negatively correlated with our multilateral PDSI measure.   Yet the opposite is true as 
shown in Table 8: the coefficients on the decile ratio are significant and of the wrong 
signs in all cases.  One reason is that the countries with especially large decile ratios (e.g. 
Mexico, Russia) also have very low median incomes and span but a small portion of the 
world income distribution.  We conclude that employing the theoretically appropriate 
income measure is critical to our results. 
Previous studies (e.g. Hallak 2005, Hummels and Skiba 2004) have shown that rich 
countries tend to import high priced goods.  Does a positive correlation between the first 
moments of the income distribution and price distribution drive our results?  If so, 
dropping the poorest countries should weaken our results.  We drop the 8 countries with 
the lowest per capita income
25 from our sample, re-calculate the PDSI and IDSI and 
obtain very similar results.  The IDSI coefficients are sometimes larger and sometimes 
                                                 
25 They are Russia, Romania, Estonia, Slovak Republic, Poland, Hungary, Mexico and Czech Republic.    
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smaller than in Tables 3-6.  Thus our results are not driven by the first moments of the 
income and price distributions.   
Our theory refers to the entire consumption price distribution but our data include 
only import prices and exclude domestic sales.  We have partially dealt with this by 
including market size and trade cost controls in regressions (19)-(22), and we also try the 
following for the bilateral regressions (19)-(20).  For importer c’, we have all the sales 
data except domestic sales originating in c’.   When comparing importer c to c’ we want a 
common reference set of countries.   Accordingly, we eliminate country c exports to c’ so 
that country c sales are missing from the sales data for both countries.  Re-calculating the 
bilateral PDSI in this manner and re-running regressions (19)-(20), we obtain results 
almost identical to Tables 4 and 6.   
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate how the distribution of income shapes patterns of 
consumption and international trade in quality differentiated varieties within narrow 
product categories. We extend Flam and Helpman (1987) to the case of multiple 
differentiated goods and multiple countries with different technologies.  We show that 
cross-country differences in the distribution of income lead to differences in variety 
consumed and in the distribution of product prices.  Our extension provides two critical 
empirical benefits.  One, by deriving results in terms of national income and price 
distributions we are able to evaluate a model that predicts heterogeneity in household 
consumption decisions without needing household consumption data.  Two, the 
relationship between income, product quality and product may vary widely across   
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products and this can confound efforts to use price data as a signal of quality.  The 
differencing removes cross-product variation in price-income slopes and allows us to 
make a clean evaluation of income distribution effects.  
To test these predictions we employ microdata on income from household surveys for 
30 countries over 20 years to construct income distributions within and across countries. 
We provide an easy to implement methodology for extracting useful information on 
export prices from the noise of raw trade data and construct price distributions.  We find 
strong support for the predictions of our model.  The pairs of importers whose income 
distributions look more similar have more export partners in common and more similar 
import price distributions.  Importers whose income distributions look more like the 
world buy from more exporters and have import price distributions that look more like 
the world.   
Our findings, based on a structural model with quality differentiation, show that a 
country’s income distribution shapes its import demand in important ways.   This view of 
trade patterns lies in stark contrast to the dominant models of horizontal product 
differentiation in the trade literature, which provide no role for heterogeneous consumers 
or income differences in explaining trade patterns.  Further, our findings lend support to 
Murphy and Shleifer’s (1997) insight that developing countries may have limited access 
to developed countries’ markets because the goods they produce lack the high qualities 
that high-income consumers demand. 
Finally, there is a rich theoretical literature on quality differentiation in trade in which 
authors combine vertical differentiation with non-homothetic preferences and income 
distributions to shed light on many questions that are difficult for horizontal   
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differentiation models to answer. They show that one country’s income re-distribution 
policy may affect another country’s income distribution (Flam and Helpman 1987, 
Matsuyama 2000), that absolute poverty and per capita growth can be sustained 
simultaneously in a fully integrated world economy (Funk 1998), that an export boom 
may push a country into industrialization in the presence of a large middle class (Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1989), and that an improvement in the productivity of one industry 
may trigger the take-off of a series of industries one after another (Matsuyama 2002).  
While we do not directly address these implications, our paper is a first step in taking the 
common elements of these models—the interactions of vertical differentiation with non-
homothetic preferences and income distribution—to the data.  
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Appendix 1 Theory 
1. Proof of Proposition 1 
Consider the setting of section 2.3, in which technology differs across supplier 
countries. Since  12 jj GGGG ∪= ∪ =  (see footnote 9), we can re-write equation (6) as 
IDSI(.) =  1 12
1




j G gg d I = − ∑ ∫ . Since fpj(I) = ajI is strictly increasing in Gj (see 
equation (13)),  12 |( . ) ( . ) |
j G gg d I − ∫ =  12
() ()




gg d p z
aa
− ∫  for all j and so 
IDSI(.) =  1 12
1( ) ( ) 1







gg d p z
aa a
= − ∑ ∫ = PDSI(.), where the last equality is 
by equation (15). 
Suppose that fpj(.) takes a more general form than ajI, but fpj(.) is strictly increasing in 








j pj pj pj H g f pz g f pz f pz d pz
−− −
= ′ − ∑ ∫ . The same steps as above go 
through and PDSI(.) = IDSI(.). Q.E.D. 
2. Missing Domestic Sales Data I 
Consider the setting of section 2.3 again and let Λc be the range of qualities that 
country c supplies. Assume that 
Assumption A1 As C → +∞, 
c mdz Λ ∫ → 0 for all c and any finite number m.  
Below we show that 
Proposition A1 As C → +∞, βP → 1 in regression (17) under Assumption A1. 
Proof: Let h1’(.) denote the price distribution of country 1 that we observe in our data. 
Suppose that country 1 supplies the quality range with the set of prices H1
S. Let the 
probability mass of H1
S be P(H1
S) =
1 1(() ) () S H hp zd p z ∫ , where h1(.) is as defined in 




S H P −
h1(p(z)) if p(z) ∈ H1 – H1
S, the set of country 
1’s import prices, and h1’(p(z)) = 0 if p(z) ∈ H1
S, the set of country 1’s domestic sales 





h2(.) if p(z) ∈ H2 – H2
S and h2’(.) = 0 
if p(z) ∈ H2
S, where P(H2
S) =
2 2(() ) () S H hp zd p z ∫ . 
 H1 – H1
S is a subset of ∪ dHd
S, where d = 2, … C, because when country 1 buys 
quality p(z) from abroad, it must buy it from some other country. For the set B ≡ (H1 – 
H1
S) ∩H2
S, by Assumption 1, 
(A1) 
''
12 |( . ) ( . ) | ( ) B hh d p z − ∫ → 0 as C → +∞.        
For the rest of the set H1 – H1
S, we observe both countries 1 and 2’s price distributions 
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 as  C  → +∞.    
By Assumption 1, as C → +∞, P(H1
S) → 0, P(H2




12 |( . ) ( . ) | ( ) S H hh d p z − ∫ → 0 as C → +∞.        
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11 12 |( . ) ( . ) |( ) S HH hh d p z − − ∫  as C → +∞.    
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11 1
'' ''
12 12 | (.) (.)| ( ) | (.) (.)| ( ) SS HH H hh d p z hh d p z − −+ − ∫∫   
   → 
11 12 |( . ) ( . ) |( ) S HH hh d p z − − ∫ → 
1 12 |( . ) ( . ) |( ) H hh d p z − ∫  as C → +∞.  
Likewise, for the set H2,  
2
''
12 |( . ) ( . ) | ( ) H hh d p z − ∫ → 
2 12 |( . ) ( . ) |( ) H hh d p z − ∫  as C → +∞.  
Therefore, as C → +∞, the PDSI that we observe in the data, 
12
''
12 |( . ) ( . ) | ( ) HHhh d p z ∪ − ∫ , 
approaches the true PDSI, 
1212 |( . ) ( . ) |( ) HHhh d p z ∪ − ∫ . Since the true PDSI equals IDSI by 
Proposition 1, our βP estimate approaches 1. Q.E.D. 
3. Missing Domestic Sales Data II 
Consider the setting of section 2.3 again. Suppose that country 1 is rich and country 2 
is poor. Assume that 
Assumption A2 Country 1 specializes in high qualities and they are not demanded by 
country 2; country 2 specializes in low qualities and they are not demanded by country 1.  
Below we show that 
Proposition A2 For countries 1 and 2, the PDSI observed in the data is no larger than 
IDSI.  
Proof: Let h1’(.) denote the price distribution of country 1 observed in the data and let 
H1
D denote the set of prices for the high qualities country 1 produces. Since country 1 
supplies H1
D and only H1
D to itself and we do not observe domestic sales data, h1’(p(z)) = 
0 if p(z) ∈ H1





h1(p(z)) if p(z) ∈ H1 – H1
D, the set of country 
1’s import prices, where P(H1
D) =
1 1(() ) () D H hp zd p z ∫  is the probability mass of H1
D and 






p(z)  ∈ H 2 – H2
D and h2’(.) = 0 if p(z) ∈ H 2
D, where h2’(.) is the observed price 
distribution of country 2, H2
D is the set of prices for the low qualities that country 2 
produces and P(H2
D) =
2 2(() ) () D H hp zd p z ∫ . 
Over H1
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D).  
Likewise, over H2
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Since the true PDSI equals IDSI by Proposition 1, the observed PDSI is no larger than 
IDSI. Q.E.D. 
For the country pairs consisting of one rich country and one poor country, Proposition 
A2 implies that missing domestic sales data is likely to compress the variation in PDSI 
relative to IDSI, resulting in βP < 1 in regression (17).  
4. General Form of Quantity Choice 
To minimize notation, consider the setup with identical technologies of section 2.1. 
The derivations below can be easily extended to the cases of different technologies across 
supplier countries or multiple differentiated goods. Let fq(I) be the quantity of the 
differentiated good consumed by each consumer with income I. In country 1, the number 
of people with income I0 is N1g1(I0)dI and they pay the price aI0 (see equation (4)) for 
N1fq(I0)g1(I0)dI units of the differentiated good. Since the total quantity of consumption 
by country 1 is N1Q1 with Q1 ≡ 
1 1 () () q G f Ig Id I ∫ , the probability mass for country 1’s 
price distribution at price aI0 (i.e. the fraction of the differentiated good with price aI0) is 
h1(aI0)dp(z) where 
(A9)   11
1
1( ) ( ) 1
(() ) ( ) q
pz pz





Thus h1(.) is the pdf of country 1’s price distribution and its support is H1 = fp(G1). 
Likewise, country 2 has the pdf  22
2
1( ) ( ) 1
(() ) ( ) q
pz pz
hp z f g
Qa a a
⎛⎞ = ⋅ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 with support H2 = 
fp(G2) and Q2 ≡ 
2 2 () () q G f Ig Id I ∫ . 
Equation (A9) is equation (5), country 1’s price distribution in section 2.1, augmented 
by fq(.)/Q1, which represents quantity weights. Weighting is necessary because quantity 
differs across prices and larger weights go to the prices with larger quantities. If fq(I) = 1 
(or a constant), fq(.) = Q1, the same quantity weight goes to all prices and equation (A9) is 
the same as equation (5). If fq(.) increases in income, so does fq(.)/Q1 (Q1 is a constant); 
larger quantity weights go to higher prices and (A9) has a fatter right tail than (5).  
On the other hand, the IDSI for countries 1 and 2 is still by equation (6) but the PDSI 
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, 
where H = fp(G). Unfortunately, it is hard to derive the exact relationship between IDSI 
and PDSI because it depends on how g1(.), g2(.) and fq(.) vary and how they interact with 
each other. We use two numerical examples to illustrate this point below. 
Suppose that the probabilities of I1 (low income) and I2 (high income) are both 0.5 for 
country 1 and they are 0.6 and 0.4, respectively, for country 2. Then IDSI = 0.2. Further, 
suppose that fq(I1) = 1. When fq(I2) = 1.4, PDSI = 0.2011 > IDSI, but when fq(I2) = 1.8, 
PDSI = 0.1948 < IDSI. Thus the general form of quantity choice may either strengthen or 
weaken the correlation between IDSI and PDSI and imply βP >1 or βP < 1 in regression 
(17).  
Appendix 2 Data 
1. Income Data 
From the LIS we extract disposable household income (DPI), a commonly used 
measure in the analysis of income inequality.  DPI includes monetary income after direct 
taxes and transfer payments.  The data are in local currency values and we convert them 
to real US dollar values using the PPP data from Penn World Tables 6.1.  DPI omits 
indirect taxes, benefits from public spending such as those from health care, education, or 
most housing subsidies, and wealth, except to the extent that it is represented by cash 
interest, rent, and dividends.  The DPI data are available at the level of households rather 
than consumers. Since household sizes vary, and consumption needs vary by age, we 
adjust the income measure using an adult equivalence scale (AES). Total household 
income is divided by the number of equivalent adults in order to get a measure of 
household “equivalent” income. Buhmann et al. (1988) propose a succinct parametric 
approximation to equivalence scales that summarizes the wide range of scales in use: 
  Adjusted Income = DPI / Household
E Size . 
The equivalence elasticity  [0,1] E∈  represents economies of scale in household size. We 
employ the LIS Equivalence Scale (E = 0.5), a commonly used scale among researchers 
who study income inequality using the LIS data (e.g. Atkinson et al. 1995). An 
alternative popular approach explicitly employs data on the numbers of adults and 
children in the household.  This approach is only feasible for a limited subset of our data. 
Once we have calculated adjusted income from each household in the survey, we 
calculate the level of income for households at each percentile of the distribution.   
Some of our countries have one (occasionally, two) wave of data missing. The 
literature has shown that quantile income levels within a country tend to follow smooth 
trends over time (e.g. Dollar and Kraay 2002, Sala-i-Martin 2005) and this finding is 
consistent with the patterns we see in the LIS data.  Accordingly, for each un-starred 
country with missing data, we estimate linear income trends by percentile using the data 
of the available waves and then extrapolate the data for the missing wave(s).   
Specifically, we fit linear trends for Australia, France, Italy, Mexico and Switzerland, 
and their average R
2 is 0.87. We fit log linear trends for Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland and Spain, and their average R
2 is 0.91. We do 
not extrapolate Hungary’s wave 1 data due to poor fit (and Hungary’s wave 1 trade data 
do not exist anyway), nor do we extrapolate Russia’s data before wave 3 because Russia 
was part of the Soviet Union.    
 
2. Miscellaneous Issues 
The raw income data for Russia 1992 have an unreliable scale (the median income is 
$2569329) and so do the raw data for Israel 1979, Poland 1986 and Russia 1995. We 
rescale these data in the following way. For each country, we find a wave with a reliable 
scale (wave t) and calculate the ratio of this country’s median income (Y50) to its real per 
capita GDP in PWT 6.1 (CGDP) for wave t. We then impute the median income for wave 
s as  50, ˆ
s Y  = CGDPs × (Y50,t/CGDPt) and impute the bth percentile income (Yb) for wave s 
as  , ˆ
bs Y  = Yb,s × ( 50, ˆ
s Y /Y50,s). For Russia we use 2000 as wave t and for Israel and Poland 
we use 1986 and 1992, respectively. 
The WTF does not have trade quantity data for wave 1 (1980) and so we use the UN 
trade data instead. However, the WTF data use the 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 classification 
whereas the UN data use 5-digit SITC Rev. 1. We follow Feenstra et al. (2005) and 
concord the SITC Rev. 1 codes to SITC Rev. 2 in the following way (this concordance is 
available from us upon request). First, the 5-digit Rev. 1 codes are truncated to the 4-digit 
level. Second, the 4-digit Rev.1 codes are matched to the corresponding 4-digit Rev.2 
codes using the maximum count of the Rev.2 frequency. In a tie, the maximum is given 
to the first 4-digit Rev.2 code listed numerically. Finally, if many Rev.1 codes are 
matched to a single Rev.2 code we aggregate these Rev.1 codes.  
   
 
 











Figure 2 Quality Choice with Different Technologies 
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Figure 3 The Range of Incomes for Wave 5 
    Multilateral           Decile Ratio
Year  Country  IDSI           P90/P10
  
 
              
2000  Norway  34.8           2.8
2000  Finland  33.8           2.9
2000  Sweden  32.2           3.0
1999  Netherlands  30.6           3.1
1999  Slovenia  37.6           3.2
2000  Austria  29.9           3.2
2000  Luxembourg  42.8           3.2
2000  Germany  28.6           3.3
2000  Belgium  28.0           3.3
1999  Hungary  53.4           3.6
1999  Poland  49.6           3.6
2000  Taiwan  23.8           3.8
2000  Canada  28.3           3.9
2000  Italy  21.7           4.5
2000  Ireland  20.6           4.6
1999  United  Kingdom  17.8           4.6
2000  Spain 19.0           4.8
2001  Israel 16.6           5.0
2000  Estonia  40.3           5.1
2000  United  States  29.5           5.4
2000  Russia  53.6           8.4
2000  Mexico  47.3           10.4
              
              
  Average  32.7           4.3
 
Notes: The data are normalized using the U.S. median income ($24,094 = 100). P10 and P90 are the 10th and 90th percentile incomes, 
respectively and the lengths of the bars represent the gap between P10 and P90.   
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Table 1 The Coverage of the LIS Income Data 
Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  Wave 4  Wave 5 
Country 
Abbre-
viation  around 1980 around 1985 around 1990  around 1995   around 2000 
Australia  AS  1981  1985  1989  1994  2000(e) 
Austria  AT  1981(e)  1987  1990(e)  1995  2000 
Belgium  BE  1981(e)  1985  1992  1995  2000 
Canada  CA  1981  1987  1991  1994  2000 
Czech Republic*  CZ  .  .  1992  1996  . 
Denmark*  DK  .  1987  1992  .  . 
Estonia*  EE  .  .  .  .  2000 
Finland  FI  1981(e)  1987  1991  1995  2000 
France  FR  1981  1984  1989  1994  1999(e) 
Germany  GE  1981  1984  1989  1994  2000 
Greece*  GR  .  .  .  1995  2000 
Hungary*  HU  .  1985(e)  1991  1994  1999 
Ireland  IE  1981(e)  1987  1990(e)  1995  2000 
Israel  IL  1979(a)  1986  1992  1997  2001(b) 
Italy  IT  1981(e)  1986  1991  1995  2000 
Luxembourg  LX  1981(e)  1985  1991  1994  2000 
Mexico  MX  1981(e)  1984  1989  1996  2000 
Netherlands  NL  1981(e)  1987  1991  1994  1999 
Norway  NW  1979  1986  1991  1995  2000 
Poland  PL  1981(e)  1986(a)  1992  1995  1999 
Romania*  RO  .  .  .  1995  . 
Russia*  RL  . .  1992(a)  1995(a)  2000 
Slovak Republic*  SK  .  .  1992  1996  . 
Slovenia*  SI  .  .  .  1997  1999 
Spain  ES  1980  1985(e)  1990  1995  2000 
Sweden  SW  1981  1987  1992  1995 2000 
Switzerland  CH  1982  1985(e)  1992  1995(e)  2000 
Taiwan  TW  1981  1986  1991  1995 2000(b) 
United Kingdom  UK  1979  1986  1991  1995  1999 
United States  US  1979  1986  1991  1994  2000 
 
Notes:  In each cell is the actual year for which the LIS income data are available for a 
given country and a given wave.  A “(e)” indicates that the data have been extrapolated 
using the available data of the same country.  A “(a)” indicates that the data have been 
rescaled because the scale of the raw data is unreliable.  A “(b)” indicates that an adjacent 
year’s PPP data have been used to convert the raw data into US dollars.  The countries 
without a “*” have income data for all the five waves.  
   
 
Table 2 Summary Statistics 
Variables     Mean/Std. Deviation    Number of Obs.  
        
IDSI(c,W)   2.868    85,133   
        
ln IDSI(c,W)    9.631    85,133  
        
IDSI(c,c')   1.539    900,617   
        
ln IDSI(c,c')    4.397    900,617  
        
PDSI(c,W)   1.833    74,212   
        
PDSI(c,c')   1.783    770,039   
        
N(c)   1.047   85,133   
        
ln N(c)    -0.084    76,622  
        
N(c,c')   0.906    899,252   
        
ln N(c,c')    0.101    741,813  
              
 
Notes:  “IDSI” means income dis-similarity index and “PDSI” means price dis-similarity 
index.  For IDSI and PDSI, “(c, W)” denotes the multilateral comparison (i.e. country c 
relative to the world) and “(c, c’)” denotes the bilateral comparison (i.e. country c relative 
to c’).  “N(c)” means the number of export partners for country c and “N(c,c’)” means the 




   
 
Table 3 The Multilateral Price Dis-similarity Index Regression 
 
  Dependent Var: PDSI(c,W) 
   Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  Wave 4    Wave 5 
IDSI(c,W)  0.341***  0.452 ***  0.310 ***  0.271 ***    0.194 *** 
  0.023  0.015  0.017  0.012    0.013 
      
Constant  28.649 ***  27.082 ***  28.023 ***  28.589 ***    31.513 *** 
  0.583  0.426  0.536  0.426    0.412 
        
Number of Obs.  9,288  14,840  15,225 ***  17,789    17,070 
      
Adjusted  R²  0.25 0.28 0.28 0.28    0.28 
      
        
IDSI(c,W)  0.130 ***  0.371 ***  0.147 ***  0.075 ***    0.023 * 
  0.029  0.016  0.018  0.014    0.014 
      
ln GDP(c)  -2.379 ***  -2.5114 ***  -3.244 ***  -2.894 ***    -3.360 *** 
 0.205  0.162  0.119  1.070    0.099 
      
ln MP(c)  0.317 ***  -0.250 ***  0.076 *  0.049 ***    0.177 *** 
 0.067  0.066  0.044  1.183    0.034 
      
Constant  58.956 ***  61.846 ***  72.811 ***  70.469 ***    77.028 *** 
  2.696  1.727  1.735  2.240    1.374 
        
Number of Obs.  9,288  14,840  15,225  17,789 ***    17,070 
      
Adjusted  R²  0.26 0.31 0.32 0.31    0.33 
            
 
Notes: This table reports the results of regression (22), with (the bottom panel) and 
without (the top panel) the additional explanatory variables that control for market size 
and trade costs.  We do not report the product fixed effects to save space.  Standard errors 
are in italics.  “***”, “**” and “*” indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.   
   
 
Table 4 The Bilateral Price Dis-similarity Index Regression 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of regression (20), with (the bottom panel) and 
without (the top panel) the additional explanatory variables that control for market size 
and trade costs.  “GDPgap(c, c’)” is the absolute value of the log difference in GDP for 
countries c and c’.  We do not report the product fixed effects to save space.  Standard 
errors are in italics.  “***”, “**” and “*” indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
     Dependent Var: PDSI(c,c')  
  Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  Wave 4    Wave 5 
IDSI(c,c')  0.085 ***    0.229 ***  0.151 ***  0.091 ***    0.075 *** 
  0.005    0.003  0.003  0.002    0.002 
        
Constant  41.963 ***     38.279 ***  39.344 ***  40.538 ***    41.461 *** 
  0.182    0.125  0.098  0.086    0.087 
           
Number of Obs.  73,977    142,038  151,483 ***  209,547     192,994 
        
Adjusted  R²  0.21   0.20  0.22  0.21   0.22 
        
           
IDSI(c,c')  0.069 ***    0.188 ***  0.123 ***  0.077 ***    0.051 *** 
  0.005    0.003  0.003  0.002    0.002 
        
GDPgap(c,c')  1.201 ***    0.5526 ***  1.206 ***  0.920 ***    1.809 *** 
 0.076    0.056  0.052  0.040    0.038 
        
ln Dist(c,c')  2.964 ***    2.869 ***  2.867 ***  2.306 ***    2.356 *** 
 0.072    0.055  0.049  0.042    0.045 
        
Constant  17.809 ***    16.364 ***  15.941 ***  21.706 ***    20.878 *** 
  0.574    0.424  0.390  0.334    0.361 
           
Number of Obs.  73,977    142,038  151,483   209,547    192,994 
        
Adjusted  R²  0.23   0.21  0.24  0.23   0.24 
             
 
Table 5 The Number of Export Partners Regression 
 
  Dependent Var: ln N (c) 
   Wave 1     Wave 2    Wave 3     Wave 4     Wave 5 
ln IDSI(c,W)   -0.280 ***    -0.466 ***  -0.225 ***  -0.114 ***    -0.116 *** 
  0.020    0.014  0.016  0.014    0.014 
        
ln GDP(c)  0.171 ***    0.177 ***  0.275 ***  -0.020 ***    0.282 *** 
 0.006    0.005  0.003  0.033    0.003 
        
ln MP(c)  0.004 *    0.035 ***  -0.001  0.338 ***    0.002 ** 
 0.002    0.002  0.002  0.036    0.001 
        
Constant  -1.230 ***    -1.042 ***  -2.730 ***  -3.703 ***    -3.243 *** 
  0.113    0.077  0.077  0.089    0.067 
            
Number of Obs.  9,596    15,350  15,699  18,333    17,644 
        
Adjusted R²  0.26    0.35  0.37  0.42    0.43 
        
   Dependent Var: N (c) 
IDSI(c,W)  -0.017 ***    -0.016 ***  -0.008 ***  -0.004 ***    -0.004 *** 
  0.001    0.001  0.001  0.001    0.001 
        
ln GDP(c)  0.200 ***    0.368 ***  0.312 ***  -0.772 ***    0.297 *** 
 0.006    0.010  0.006  0.043    0.004 
        
ln MP(c)  -0.004 *    0.012 ***  0.001  1.228 ***    0.004 ** 
 0.002    0.004  0.002  0.048    0.002 
        
Constant  -0.856 ***    -3.017 ***  -2.604 ***  -4.664 ***    -2.555 *** 
  0.085    0.106  0.085  0.092    0.060 
            
Number of Obs.  10,314    18,414  17,160  20,020    19,225 
        
Adjusted R²  0.25    0.13  0.15  0.30    0.23 
             
 
Notes: This table reports the results of regression (21) for the log linear (the top panel) 
and linear (the bottom panel) specifications.  We do not report the product fixed effects to 
save space.  Standard errors are in italics.  “***”, “**” and “*” indicate significance 
levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
   
 
Table 6 The Number of Common Export Partners Regression 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of regression (19) for the log linear (the top panel) 
and linear (the bottom panel) specifications.  “GDPgap(c, c’)” is the absolute value of the 
log difference in GDP for countries c and c’.  We do not report the product fixed effects 
to save space.  Standard errors are in italics.  “***”, “**” and “*” indicate significance 
levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
  Dependent Var: ln N(c,c') 
   Wave 1     Wave 2    Wave 3      Wave 4     Wave 5 
ln IDSI(c,c')  -0.173 ***    -0.280 ***  -0.224 ***  -0.253 ***    -0.176 *** 
  0.003    0.003  0.002  0.002    0.002 
               
GDPgap(c,c')  -0.024 ***    0.0430 ***  0.018 *  -0.023 ***    -0.083 *** 
 0.002    0.001  0.001  0.001    0.001 
             
ln Dist(c,c')  -0.106 ***    -0.104 ***  -0.100 ***  -0.014 ***    -0.005 *** 
 0.002    0.001  0.001  0.001    0.001 
             
Constant  1.554 ***    1.771 ***  1.522 ***  1.020 ***    0.794 *** 
  0.016    0.012  0.011  0.010    0.010 
             
Number of Obs.  73,825    134,582  146,247  201,172    185,987 
             
Adjusted  R²  0.20   0.30  0.28  0.26   0.25 
              
   Dependent Var: N(c,c') 
IDSI(c,c')  -0.013 ***    -0.015 ***  -0.011 ***  -0.012 ***    -0.008 *** 
  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000 
             
GDPgap(c,c') -0.034  ***    0.0263  ***  -0.002  -0.024 ***    -0.077 *** 
 0.003    0.003  0.002  0.002    0.002 
             
ln Dist(c,c')  -0.136 ***    -0.197 ***  -0.177 ***  -0.077 ***    -0.082 *** 
 0.003    0.003  0.002  0.002    0.002 
             
Constant  2.615 ***    3.109 ***  2.844 ***  2.136 ***    2.163 *** 
  0.022    0.020  0.018  0.016    0.020 
                        
Number of Obs.  86,658    174,016  172,808  242,187    223,583 
             
Adjusted  R²  0.08   0.10  0.09  0.07   0.04 
                             
 
Table 7 The Results for Consumption Goods 
 
   Wave 1    Wave 2    Wave 3    Wave 4    Wave 5 
                  
Multilateral PDSI, Reg. (22)                   
  -0.008    0.420 ***    0.121 ***    0.100 ***    0.093 *** 
  0.063    0.036    0.039    0.031    0.028 
                  
Bilateral PDSI, Reg. (20)                   
  0.068 ***    0.268 ***   0.179 ***    0.122 ***    0.094 *** 
  0.012    0.008    0.006    0.004    0.004 
                  
Multilateral N, Reg. (21)                   
  -0.241 ***    -0.546 ***   -0.153 ***   -0.242 ***    -0.261 ***
  0.043    0.033    0.035    0.032    0.029 
                  
Bilateral N, Reg. (19)                   
  -0.205 ***    -0.385 ***   -0.260 ***   -0.350 ***    -0.244 ***
  0.008    0.007    0.005    0.004    0.004 
                             
 
Notes:  This table reports the coefficients on the income dis-similarity index, IDSI, and 
their standard errors when regressions (19)-(22) are run for consumption goods only.  We 
use the UN Broad Economic Classification system to designate which products are 
consumption goods.  Standard errors are in italics.  “***”, “**” and “*” indicate 
significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
   
 
Table 8 The Results Using the 90-10 Decile Ratio 
 
      Wave 1    Wave 2    Wave 3    Wave 4    Wave 5 
                    
Multilateral PDSI, Reg. (22)                   
                    
 P90/P10(c)  5.455  ***    3.324  ***    1.776 ***    1.038 ***    1.132 *** 
   0.276    0.141    0.106    0.101    0.076 
                    
  ln GDP(c)  -4.046 ***   -5.368 ***   -4.001 ***   -6.170 ***    -3.646 *** 
   0.167    0.165    0.113    1.063    0.091 
                    
  ln MP(c)  0.714 ***    0.423 ***    0.091 ***    3.112    0.222 *** 
   0.065    0.065    0.043    1.182    0.032 
                    
  Constant  59.202 ***   85.276 ***   79.913 ***   70.947    75.928 ***
   1.777    1.473    1.427    2.105    1.119 
                      
  Number of Obs.  9,288    14,840    15,225    17,789    17,070 
                    
 Adjusted  R²  0.29    0.31    0.33    0.32    0.34 
                    
Multilateral N, Reg. (21)                   
                    
  P90/P10(c)  -0.186 ***   -0.150 ***   -0.094 ***   -0.083 ***    -0.065 *** 
   0.009    0.008    0.005    0.004    0.003 
                    
  ln GDP(c)  0.317 ***    0.494 ***    0.352 ***    -0.530 ***    0.321 *** 
   0.005    0.010    0.006    0.043    0.004 
                    
  ln MP(c)  -0.026 ***   -0.018 ***   0.000     0.997 ***    -0.001 
   0.002    0.004    0.002    0.048    0.001 
                    
  Constant  -1.814 ***   -4.024 ***   -2.994 ***   -4.566 ***    -2.654 *** 
   0.056    0.092    0.071    0.086    0.049 
                      
  Number of Obs.  10,314    18,414    17,160    20,020    19,225 
                    
 Adjusted  R²  0.25    0.14    0.16    0.31    0.25 
                                
 
Notes:  This table reports the results of regressions (21) and (22) with the income dis-
similarity index, IDSI, replaced by the decile ratio.  Standard errors are in italics.  “***”, 
“**” and “*” indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 